I began the other day to think about some potential projects for the class. I have found this process to be a little more laboring than originally thought, but have managed to come up with a few ideas.
-I am mostly interested in Public Relations so there are hopes that I can put together some PR materials for a company around the Clemson area, but no exact companies come to mind at this point and time.
-I may have a job very soon with the Department of Institutional Development at Clemson, so I am quite sure that they could need some technical or business writing. This all depends on IF I get the job and what department I get placed on, so more to come on this option.
These are the best of the ideas that I have come up with. I am sure more will come to mind, especially after our class brainstorming tomorrow. And of course, any suggestions that may come to mind from everyone else is welcomed.
Wednesday, August 27, 2008
Monday, August 25, 2008
D.A. Winsor: An Example for Technical Communication
First of all, I find it very interesting that Winsor would use the Challenger tragedy to help explain the importance of communication. This provides a very real and extreme example of how a breakdown in communication can effect a situation and its decisions.
I find Winsor's first "factor" in the breakdown of communication an interesting one. Here vantage point, goals, values and interests have an overwhelming impact on what knowledge you may have. If you have different goals, interests, etc. from those that you are communicating information to, that information you are presenting may be taken completely out of the context in which you intended. This raises a interesting question: Is it the job of the person communicating the information to make sure that the person receiving the information interprets this information in the correct context or should it be the receiver of the information that should be responsible for looking at information from all angles?
Winsor also states that often bad news is not passed upward in an organization and bad news is also less likely to be believed than that of good news. In PR, there is no such thing as bad publicity (bad news); this just represents an opportunity to either correct the mistake or present a better image in the face of adversity. Why should this mentality not be utilized in technical situations? Was this not an opportunity for MTI, NASA, etc. to correct the faulty equipment, and become heroes?
Early responses to the bad news support previous research about the acceptance and communication of bad news. MTI did not see the problem as critical and was reluctant to inform Marshall Space Center. And while internally it seemed as if Marshall believe this situation to be of major concern (they were on MTI to rectify the problem), they seemed to be treating this as a non-issue in regards to their communication with NASA. To me this resembles the reaction one might witness from a child who is not doing well in school. The child blows of questions from their parents about their progress in school while behind the scenes they feverishly try to correct the problem on their own.
Once NASA had to be informed, Marshall changed their tune. Now all of a sudden, the O-ring problem was, well a "non-problem." If it could be seen as a MTI problem, then it was serious, but if it became Marshall's problem, then their was nothing that needed to be done.
The communication "run-around" continued and in my opinion only worsened as more problems, most specifically the faulty nozzel joint, arose. When launch constraints were implemented, MTI claims to not have even been notified, while it has been all but proven otherwise. NASA officials, however, were not notified by Marshall, who kept this information internal even though regulations require Level II officials be informed. Why, when the situation became more and more serious did Marshall and MTI not communicate this information? Did they really not believe the problem to serious or where they merely trying to save face and fix this without causing much concern?
In Boisjoly's internal memo regarding the O-ring failures, there was a sense of urgency. He knew how potentially serious this could become and communicated this well. But, in the external memo that was written by Russell with assistance from Boisjoly, only obscure facts that were difficult to translate were presented. There was not emotion in this memo with no sense of urgency present. Why did Boisjoly not make sure that Russell understood the possible consequences and communicate those in the memo that went to NASA? Or did Russell know but was still reluctant to believe them?
I believe this miscommunication occurred for several reasons. When these problems first came to the attention of MTI and Marshall, they simply thought they have enough time to correct the situation without having to delay the launch, losing their contract, etc. As time went on however and more problems arose, MTI and Marshall had been living this lie for too long to treat it as anything other than a "non-problem." Maybe they had even began to believe themselves that there was nothing to be concerned with. Whatever the reason, the most important thing learned from this is that you must have a culture that allows information to be presented and is received favorably no matter implications.
I find Winsor's first "factor" in the breakdown of communication an interesting one. Here vantage point, goals, values and interests have an overwhelming impact on what knowledge you may have. If you have different goals, interests, etc. from those that you are communicating information to, that information you are presenting may be taken completely out of the context in which you intended. This raises a interesting question: Is it the job of the person communicating the information to make sure that the person receiving the information interprets this information in the correct context or should it be the receiver of the information that should be responsible for looking at information from all angles?
Winsor also states that often bad news is not passed upward in an organization and bad news is also less likely to be believed than that of good news. In PR, there is no such thing as bad publicity (bad news); this just represents an opportunity to either correct the mistake or present a better image in the face of adversity. Why should this mentality not be utilized in technical situations? Was this not an opportunity for MTI, NASA, etc. to correct the faulty equipment, and become heroes?
Early responses to the bad news support previous research about the acceptance and communication of bad news. MTI did not see the problem as critical and was reluctant to inform Marshall Space Center. And while internally it seemed as if Marshall believe this situation to be of major concern (they were on MTI to rectify the problem), they seemed to be treating this as a non-issue in regards to their communication with NASA. To me this resembles the reaction one might witness from a child who is not doing well in school. The child blows of questions from their parents about their progress in school while behind the scenes they feverishly try to correct the problem on their own.
Once NASA had to be informed, Marshall changed their tune. Now all of a sudden, the O-ring problem was, well a "non-problem." If it could be seen as a MTI problem, then it was serious, but if it became Marshall's problem, then their was nothing that needed to be done.
The communication "run-around" continued and in my opinion only worsened as more problems, most specifically the faulty nozzel joint, arose. When launch constraints were implemented, MTI claims to not have even been notified, while it has been all but proven otherwise. NASA officials, however, were not notified by Marshall, who kept this information internal even though regulations require Level II officials be informed. Why, when the situation became more and more serious did Marshall and MTI not communicate this information? Did they really not believe the problem to serious or where they merely trying to save face and fix this without causing much concern?
In Boisjoly's internal memo regarding the O-ring failures, there was a sense of urgency. He knew how potentially serious this could become and communicated this well. But, in the external memo that was written by Russell with assistance from Boisjoly, only obscure facts that were difficult to translate were presented. There was not emotion in this memo with no sense of urgency present. Why did Boisjoly not make sure that Russell understood the possible consequences and communicate those in the memo that went to NASA? Or did Russell know but was still reluctant to believe them?
I believe this miscommunication occurred for several reasons. When these problems first came to the attention of MTI and Marshall, they simply thought they have enough time to correct the situation without having to delay the launch, losing their contract, etc. As time went on however and more problems arose, MTI and Marshall had been living this lie for too long to treat it as anything other than a "non-problem." Maybe they had even began to believe themselves that there was nothing to be concerned with. Whatever the reason, the most important thing learned from this is that you must have a culture that allows information to be presented and is received favorably no matter implications.
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